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A series of new democracy measures have been introduced in recent years, many based on previous 
measures, but some offering original data. This chapter provides critical discussion of three new 
measures based on original data collection: the Democracy Index (DI) constructed by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) compiled by the 
Bertelsmann Foundation, and the Political Regimes of the World dataset provided by Boix, Miller, 
and Rosato (BMR). Our assessment shows that DI and BTI share many features: They have limited 
temporal coverage, they are based on comprehensive definitions, and they have many expert-coded 
indicators, which are combined into graded sub-indices and an overall democracy measure. In 
contrast, BMR is based on a narrow definition of democracy, offers a single, in-house coded, 
dichotomous variable, and covers most independent countries back to 1800. All three measures 
suffer from a lack of transparency. Our evaluation concludes with a brief comparison of these 
datasets with two other new datasets based on original data collection: the Lexical Index of 
Electoral Democracy (LIED) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). The former provides 
unmatched coverage of historical polities and annual updates of disaggregate indicators and a series 
of ordered, crisp regime categories. V-Dem is based on scores from more experts combined with 
a sophisticated measurement model, and it offers a comprehensive coverage and more indicators 
on different aspects of democracy than any other dataset. Correlation analyses indicate that it is 
implausible to consider the examined democracy measures to be interchangeable across the board; 
















Systematic data is required to assess claims about the conjunctures, causes, and consequences of 
democracy. Quality measures are in high demand, and the number of available datasets on the 
market has increased by leaps and bounds in recent decades. Some of the new measures, including 
the Unified Democracy Scores (Pemstein et al. 2010), the Democracy Barometer (Bühlmann et al. 
2012), Neuer Index der Demokratie (Lauth 2008), and the Global State of Democracy Indices 
(International IDEA 2020), are based on extant quantitative measures of democracy and good 
governance, such as the well-known Polity data (Marshall et al. 2018), the Democracy‒
Dictatorship dataset (Cheibub et al. 2010), and the various measures collected by Freedom House 
(2020). Other newcomers primarily rely on original data collection. Scholars, practitioners in the 
policy community, and journalists have used these new ratings to draw conclusions about the state 
of democracy around the world and to reflect on and analyze the causes and consequences of rule 
by the people versus rule by authoritarian leaders. 
However, in contrast to the older, more well-established measures, the new kids on the block have 
yet to be subjected to sustained, comparative evaluations (but see Lauth 2010; Coppedge et al. 
2017). This means that users lack information about the respective strengths and weaknesses of 
these new measures. Upon closer examination, many of the descriptive and causal inferences 
relying on these data might prove to rest on shaky foundations. Consider here that previous 
examinations have revealed significant variation among democracy datasets. These differences 
concern their focus, their reliability and validity, and – by implication – their correlates (see, e.g., 
Coppedge & Gerring et al. 2011; Elff & Ziaja 2018; Skaaning 2018). 
Against this backdrop, we provide a critical discussion of new measures based on new and unique 
data and that figure prominently among scholars and practitioners: the Democracy Index (DI) 
constructed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2020), the Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
(BTI) compiled by the Bertelsmann Foundation (2020), and Boix, Miller, and Rosato’s (2013) 
dataset on political regimes (BMR).  Inspired by the seminal analytical frameworks developed by 
Hans-Joachim Lauth (2004) and Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002; see also Müller & Pickel 
2007), our assessment addresses conceptualization, measurement, aggregation, and internal quality 
assessment. The primary goal of this exercise is to help the users of democracy measures to make 
conscious choices when deciding on which measure (or measures) to use – and to highlight some 
of the issues to which they should pay attention when so doing. 
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We find that DI and BTI share many features: They have limited temporal coverage, they are based 
on comprehensive definitions, and they rely on many expert-coded indicators, which are combined 
into graded sub-indices and an overall democracy measure. In contrast, BMR is based on a narrow 
definition of democracy, offers a single, in-house coded, dichotomous variable, and covers most 
independent countries back to 1800. All three measures suffer from a lack of transparency. We 
supplement our critical examination with a brief comparison with two original datasets on 
democracy that one of us (Skaaning) has been part of developing: the Lexical Index of Electoral 
Democracy (LIED) and Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem). 
The comparison reveals that LIED provides unmatched coverage of historical polities. It includes 
a small number of disaggregate indicators on electoral aspects of democracy, which are used to 
distinguish between a series of crisp regime types ordered as a systematic scale. It is thus suitable 
to answer questions, where categorical or ordinal distinctions between political regimes play an 
important role.  
When one is rather interested in more fine-grained distinctions and aspects of democracy beyond 
the electoral core of democracy, V-Dem has a competitive edge. In addition to extensive coverage, 
it offers many more factual and evaluative indicators on diverse aspects of democracy – broadly 
understood – than any other dataset. Moreover, the evaluative indicators are based on scores from 
many experts per country-year combined with a sophisticated measurement model, which uses 
information about cross-coder agreement, coder characteristics, responses to vignettes, and self-
reported uncertainty to reduce biases and assess the reliability. 
We end our examination with an analysis of co-variation, which shows that although the measures 
are all generally highly correlated, the association is strikingly low in some instances. This means 
that it is implausible to consider the examined democracy measures to be interchangeable across 
the board; in some contexts, they are clearly not. 
 
Assessment criteria 
Any systematic assessment should be guided by explicit criteria. When organized in an elaborate 
framework, the basis for such a task is generally stronger. As mentioned above, our assessment is 
inspired by a framework formulated by Lauth (2004: 227‒237), which has previously proven 
successful in evaluating other democracy measures. Lauth divides his assessment criteria into four 
dimensions: definition, operationalization, empirical power, and scrutiny of quality. Each of these 
dimensions is translated into or operationalized via a number of specific questions, which are listed 
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in Table 1. The table also includes the questions associated with another framework devised by 
Munck and Verkuilen (2002). It distinguishes between conceptualization, measurement, 
aggregation, and empirical scope. While this assessment framework also has four dimensions, 
Munck and Verkuilen’s distinctions are only partly overlapping with those proposed by Lauth, and 
it appears that many of the questions direct attention to different things. However, a closer look 
reveals that the criteria included in the two analytical frameworks are in fact quite similar.    
 
Table 1: Assessment criteria based on two analytical frameworks 
Lauth’s assessment criteria Munck and Verkuilen’s assessment criteria 
Definition: Is the definition 
adequately described? How precise is 
it, and how many dimensions does it 
express? 
Conceptualization: Is the definition overly 
maximalist or overly minimalist? Are there problems 
of redundancy and conflation regarding the 
organization of attributes and sub-attributes?  
Operationalization: Is the 
measurement based on appropriate 
sources/indicators? Which scales are 
used? How is the overall measure 
constructed (aggregation procedure, 
thresholds)?   
Measurement: Is the measurement based on multiple 
indicators? Do the indicators ensure cross-system 
equivalence? Do the indicators minimize measurement 
error? Is it possible to crosscheck the indicators 
through multiple sources? Do the scales maximize 
homogeneity within measurement classes with the 
minimum number of necessary distinctions? 
Empirical power: Does the measure 
offer broad coverage and forceful 
discrimination between democratic 
and autocratic regimes and between 
different levels of democratic quality?  
Aggregation: Is the level of aggregation balanced 
regarding parsimony and concerns with underlying 
dimensionality and differentiation? Is there 
correspondence between the theory of the relationship 
between defining elements and the selected 
aggregation rule? 
Scrutiny of quality: Are issues of 
reliability and validity carefully 
considered and examined by 
appropriate tests?   
Empirical scope: Which units (typically countries 
and years) does the measure cover? 
 
We generally agree with the usefulness of the criteria outlined in Table 1. These guidelines reflect 
five underlying ideals: precision, justification, transparency, coverage, and nuance. Systematic 
measurement of democracy requires a clear focus; that is, an explicit and coherent idea about the 
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core concept together with consistency between a) the concept and the resulting measure and b) 
between the scores for similar cases using similar procedures.  
Moreover, every choice must be justified theoretically and – if relevant – empirically, and all 
processes (who, when, how) should be carefully described. Finally, the data should preferably cover 
many units and be able to capture relevant distinctions. While this brief summary does not fully 
appreciate all of the complexities associated with the frameworks mentioned above, it does offer 
some focal points for structuring our evaluation. 
 
Conceptualization 
Following up on the assessment criteria outlined above, the definition of what is being measured 
is a natural starting point for our assessment; examining the quality of the measurement makes 
little sense without a basic understanding of the concept. Table 2 summarizes the dimensions and 
specifications associated with the conceptual frameworks underlying the three measures we 
evaluate. 
BTI’s concept of democracy covers five dimensions: stateness, political participation, rule of law, 
stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration. It thus goes beyond core 
features of democracy, such as free and fair elections and political liberties, by also including the 
functioning of the rule of law and stateness together with the associational life and political culture. 
The aim is to capture both the degree to which a polity is a well-functioning democracy and 
whether democracy has consolidated. 
There are two major problems associated with this conceptualization. First, it conflates the level 
of democracy with levels of democratic stability (see Bollen & Jackman 1989). While these features 
might be correlated, they refer to different things. Second, the BTI conceptual framework 
incorporates aspects that are better considered potential causes or consequences of the degree of 
democracy (and regime stability) than constitutive components, even given a relatively 
comprehensive, liberal understanding of democracy (see Møller & Skaaning 2011; Lauth 2004; 
2013; Merkel 2004). More particularly, stateness, stable institutions, and political and social 
integration do not directly capture the degree of democracy. 
We fully understand why the people behind BTI want to track all of these phenomena with their 
dataset, since they are interested in broad political transformations that go beyond whether the 
ground rules of democracy are established or not. However, this does not mean that the different 
dimensions must all be lumped together under a single concept. Political opinions and civil society 
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activism might be important for democratic development or vice versa (see Welzel 2013), but 
including these issues in the concept of democracy is unwarranted. 
Table 2: Conceptual frameworks 
 Conceptual dimensions Specifications/Sub-dimensions 
BMR 
Participation • Minimal level of suffrage 
Contestation 
• Decisions to govern the state are taken through free and 
fair voting procedures 
BTI 
Stateness 
• Clarity about the nation’s existence as a state 
• Adequately established and differentiated power 
structures 
Political participation 
• Populace decides who rules 
• Political freedoms 
Rule of law 
• State powers check and balance one another 
• Civil rights 
Stability of democratic institutions 
• Democratic institutions capable of performing 
• Democratic institutions adequately accepted 
Political and social integration 
• Stable patterns of representation exist for mediating 
between society and state 
• Consolidated civic culture 
DI 
Electoral process and pluralism 
• Free and fair competitive elections 
• Satisfaction of election-related aspects of political 
freedom 
Functioning government 
• Minimum quality of functioning of government ensures 
that democratically-based decisions can be implemented 
Political participation 
• Active, freely chosen participation of citizens in public 
life 
Democratic political culture 
• Citizens accept the judgment of the voters and allow for 
the peaceful transfer of power 
Civil liberties 
• Protection of basic human rights, including freedom of 
speech, expression and of the press; freedom of religion; 
freedom of assembly and association; and the right to due 
judicial process 
 
A political regime is first and foremost a question about the access to political power and, 
secondarily, about the organization and exercise of political power (Skaaning 2012). What this 
primary and secondary dimension have in common is an emphasis on political procedures and 
institutions. Political culture is orthogonal to these issues, and stateness is only indirectly relevant 
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to the degree that there is an overlap with rule of law prescriptions, which underwrites the 
implementation of democratic decisions. 
DI’s understanding of democracy also goes beyond procedural-institutional criteria. It 
encapsulates five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of 
government, political participation, and political culture. Free elections, civil rights and liberties, 
and implementation power are thus supplemented with criteria that demand the active 
participation of citizens in public life, including elections and civil society organization, and citizens 
support of, trust in, and satisfaction with democratic political institutions. Those behind DI argue 
in favor of this choice by stating that a vibrant democratic political culture is important for the 
legitimacy, smooth functioning, and sustainability of democracy. Moreover, they assert that a 
democracy becomes elitist and begins to wither when citizens are unwilling to participate in public 
debate, elections, and political organizations. Even though good arguments can surely be made in 
favor of thick understandings of democracy, this particular line of reasoning merely exposes the 
conflation between constitutive components of democracy and potential determinants. 
BMR uses Dahl’s (1971: 3) concept of polyarchy and its two underlying dimensions, political 
contestation and participation, as conceptual foundation. But they do so inconsistently. BMR 
requires a minimum level of suffrage, which in their understanding can be less than the universal 
adult suffrage emphasized by Dahl. In addition, they require that political decision-making power 
is allocated through free and fair voting procedures. This is in line with Dahl’s demand for elected 
officials and free, fair, and frequent elections, but BMR emphatically does not include civil liberties, 
although freedom of speech and association are institutional requirements for polyarchy, according 
to Dahl. This means that the BMR conceptualization is actually closer to Schumpeter’s (1942: 269) 
minimalist understanding of democracy than Dahl’s notion of polyarchy. Hence, it contrasts with 
the (overly) maximalist conceptions suggested by BTI and DI. In the newest edition, BMR is 
published in two versions. One is the original, while the other includes an additional criterion: 
enfranchisement of at least half of all adult female citizens. 
 
Measurement 
It is one thing to establish a sound conceptual basis for a measure; operationalizing it is another. 
The construction of a novel dataset is no easy task, and numerous decisions must be made. Table 
3 summarizes the information about the coverage, protocols, and indicators of the three evaluated 
measures. 
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Table 3: Coverage, protocol, and indicators 
 Coverage Measurement protocol Indicators Measurement 
level 





Assignment of scores based on 
written sources, including 


















Based on standardized 
codebook. One country expert 
assigns scores grounded in a 
narrative country report. A 
second country expert provides 
ratings independently of the 
first expert. Then, for each 
region, two regional experts 
review and calibrate these 
ratings. Thereafter, regional 
coordinators and the BTI team 
calibrate the scores for all 
countries. Finally, ratings are 
calibrated by a panel of 
scholars and practitioners 
included in the BTI board. 






















Based on checklist, one 
country expert affiliated with 
the EIU assesses the criteria. 
Subsequent calibration of 
regional and global levels by 
the EIU team. 


















to each level) 
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DI provides democracy ratings for 165 countries and two territories (Hong Kong and Palestine) 
since 2006. Its coverage is quite similar to BTI, except that the latter only offers biennial ratings 
and does not include OECD countries with donor status. In practice, this means that Western 
Europe, Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and the USA are excluded together with micro-
states. These limitations put severe restrictions on the academic use of the DI data. In contrast, 
BMR provides data for virtually all independent countries (excluding a number of small nineteenth 
century German principalities and the like) from 1800 until 2015. Unfortunately, it only offers 
irregular updates, while the two other datasets are updated annually and biennially, respectively. 
Another major difference between BMR, on the one hand, and BTI and DI on the other is found 
at the indicator level. DI compiles no less than 60 indicators and BTI 18 indicators, whereas BMR 
only provides a single score per country-year, although the operational definition clearly 
distinguishes between three criteria. In addition, government turnover through elections is 
employed as a strong indicator of democracy, but it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition, 
and the use of the concept lacks an explicit definition and separate identification. Since the link 
between the assignment of scores and specific evidence is not documented for individual cases, it 
is unclear which of these criteria are not fulfilled when particular countries are coded as autocracies. 
A main problem with DI is that the data for the disaggregated indicators are not published, and 
the review process lacks transparency. Moreover, the list of experts is not published. One therefore 
cannot tell why countries receive particular scores. The BTI review process also lacks transparency, 
as no information is provided about when or why scores have been changed in the different stages. 
However, some aspects of the data generation are laudable: the experts are named (263 out of 
286), the data for all indicators are made public, and the dataset is accompanied by narrative 
country reports describing the conditions that motivated the rating. 
Regarding the indicator scales, DI uses a combination of dichotomous and trichotomous ratings 
for all of its 60 indicators. Even though this procedure loses many nuances, DI argues that it is 
preferable due to the difficulty in defining meaningful and comparable criteria for more fine-
grained scales, meaning that experts are less likely to assign identical scores. Moreover, 
comparability between indicator scores is said to be lower when the number of possible scores is 
higher. Both of these arguments are questionable. Even if the chances of coders assigning the 
exact same score are generally higher when there are fewer (vs. many) categories, crude scales are 
not inherently better than fine-grained scales, neither regarding the assignment of scores to 
individual indicators (no matter contextual differences) nor regarding comparisons across 
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indicators. The reliability of indicators and indices depends not only on the number and magnitude 
of errors but also on their sensitivity (Elkins 2000: 298‒299). 
While attaching distinct meanings to the different levels is a valuable feature for some purposes, 
scales with few distinctions often have a disadvantage with respect to homogeneity within 
measurement classes. This point is particularly relevant for BMR, which only offers a single 
dichotomous measure. This measure is advantageous when one is interested in crisp distinctions 
between democratic transitions and breakdowns, but it falls short when one is interested in more 
nuanced differences and similarities over time and across polities (Collier & Adcock 1999). The 18 
BTI indicators are more fine-grained, with 10-point scales that are each linked to four different 
qualitative anchors. It is somewhat problematic, however, that these anchors seem to have changed 
over the years (from the 2010 report to the 2012 report). 
The evaluated measures can be divided into two groups according to the types of sources on which 
they rely. BTI and DI are primarily based on expert assessments supplemented with data from 
public opinion surveys, such as the World Values Survey. This is mostly intended to capture 
political culture, but DI also uses survey data to measure the functioning of government and 
respect for civil liberties. Where relevant survey data are not available, data for similar countries 
and expert assessments are used to provide estimates. BMR relies neither on country experts nor 
survey data; instead, the researchers behind the measure have assigned scores themselves (in-house 
hand coding) based on information from written sources, such as constitutions, laws, public 
statistics, and regional and country-specific historical accounts. 
In-house coding typically creates consistency with respect to the use of sources and interpretation 
of key concepts, but detailed information is often not readily available and/or it is difficult to 
comprehend. In contrast, relevant case knowledge is the advantage of expert assessments, but 
more people becoming involved in the score assignment brings a higher risk of different 
understandings and standards being applied.  
This risk increases exponentially when enlisting public opinion surveys; while such surveys can 
help capture the relevant experiences of ordinary people, citizen responses about abstract beliefs 
are not a solid source for democracy measurement. All of the coding strategies can be biased in 
different ways due to limited access to relevant material, personal characteristics, and method-




Aggregation and quality assessment 
When using indicator scores to measure a concept, it is important to be explicit about the 
theoretical relationship between the different elements and then to choose an aggregation rule 
reflecting this relationship (Goertz 2006). BMR does declare that different aspects are considered 
necessary conditions; however, since they do not offer separate scores for lower-level indicators, 
the aggregation is basically in the heads of the coders, which renders it difficult to evaluate and 
replicate the construction of the measure. 
The BTI and DI procedures also stand in contrast to BMR on this issue, as they do not present 
any arguments for how the dimensions (and sub-dimensions) relate to each other and to the overall 
democracy concept, apart from stating the importance of all of the emphasized elements. Both 
democracy measures are based on a two-step aggregation rule, each step consisting of simple 
averages/addition. 
This aggregation procedure indicates that the different elements are partly substitutable. It thus 
seems inconsistent when BTI uses fixed thresholds (the levels of which are not explicitly justified) 
on the individual dimensions to distinguish between democracies and autocracies. These criteria 
indicate that the different aspects are necessary conditions rather than partially substitutable. More 
particularly, they prescribe that, in order to be a democracy, the score for free and fair elections 
should be higher than 6, while the scores for effective power to govern, association/assembly 
rights, freedom of expression, separation of powers, and civil rights should be higher than 4, and 
the average score for monopoly on the use of force and basic administration should be higher than 
3. 
DI is more faithful to its aggregation rule, as it uses values on the overall democracy index to place 
countries within four ordered regime categories: Cases with scores greater than 8 are full 
democracies; those with scores greater than 6 and less than or equal to 8 are flawed democracies; 
when a case scores greater than 4 and less than or equal to 6, it is categorized as a hybrid regime; 
the rest – scoring 4 or less – are placed in the set of authoritarian regimes. Nonetheless, this 
example adds to the many unwarranted attempts at creating categorical regime distinctions based 
on continuous measures (see Bogaards 2010; 2012). Moreover, the broad conception of democracy 
combined with the additive aggregation procedure means that countries without free elections but 
well-performing states can receive a much better overall score than countries with free elections 
but weakly performing states. For example, with an index score of 2.63 for 2019, Guinea-Bissau 
was categorized as authoritarian, while Singapore with a score of 6.02 on the 10-point scale was 
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grouped together with the flawed democracies, despite recent elections in Guinea-Bissau arguably 
having been more contested than has those in Singapore. Even countries with one-party elections 
or no national elections at all get a higher democracy score than Guinea-Bissau. This is implausible 
given the sine qua non status of free elections in democratic theory (see Møller & Skaaning 2011). 
 
Table 4: Aggregation rule, regime distinctions, and quality assessment 
 Aggregation rule Regime distinctions Quality assessment 
BMR 
NA (three necessary 
conditions but no 
disaggregate indicator 
scores) 









(seven threshold values 
linked to particular 
indicators marking 
minimum requirements) 
Percentage agreement or 
near-agreement between 
coders (1 year only). Brief 
discussion of a few 
alternatives. Correlation of 
two sub-indices with 
alternative measures. 
DI 









Note: *if the scores for three indicators – national elections free and fair; security of voters; influence of foreign 
powers on government – are 0 (or .5), 1 point (or .5) is subtracted from the electoral process and pluralism index. 
Similarly, if the score for the indicator on the capability of the civil service to implement policies is 0, 1 point is 
deducted from the functioning of government index. 
 
Democracy measures that receive significant attention in the scholarly community can expect to 
be subjected to critical evaluation, as is done in this chapter. But even before the publication of 
the data, one would expect the data providers themselves to have assessed the quality of the final 
product. However, in terms of quality assessment that goes beyond reviews (and revisions) of the 
indicator scores, the providers of the measures reviewed above have not done much – or, at least, 
they have not published the results of such quality assessments (see Table 4). DI is not 
accompanied by any validity checks in the white paper describing the measure. The 2006 BTI 
report published the percentage of scores where the first and second coders agreed or almost 
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agreed on the indicator scores, briefly discussed a few alternative measures, and showed the 
correlations between two sub-indices (Stateness and Rule of law) and selected World Governance 
Indicators (Political stability and absence of violence and Voice and accountability).1 The paper 
introducing BMR to the scholarly community has a critical discussion of alternative democracy 
measures and shows the correlation coefficient between these and BMR. 
This state of affairs is not optimal, and numerous different ways to validate measures have been 
devised (Seawright & Collier 2014); for example, the people behind the new datasets could have 
carried out sophisticated inter-coder reliability tests, assessments of the sensitivity of country 
ranking to choice of aggregation rule, and statistical examinations of multiple measures or 
indicators to assess dimensionality and to estimate the degree of measurement error based on 
assumptions about descriptive and causal relations (see, e.g., Bollen 1993; Bollen & Paxton 2000; 
Bush 2017; Casper & Tufis 2003; Elkins 2000; Elff & Ziaja 2018; Steiner 2016; Trier & Jackman 
2008; Vaccaro 2021). In addition, they could have discussed the plausibility of scores based on in-
depth assessments of particular cases, especially regarding country-years showing large 
disagreement across different measures (see, e.g., Bogaards 2007; Bowman et al. 2005; Gunitsky 
2015; McHenry 2000). 
  
LIED and V-Dem as complementary alternatives 
Our review of BMR, BTI, and DI has revealed significant differences with respect to their 
respective strengths and weaknesses. Fortunately, there are readily available alternatives offering 
detailed data and high coverage without compromising on measurement validity. 
For scholars and others searching for a measure that presents meaningful categorical distinctions, 
LIED is a viable option (Skaaning et al. 2015). The scope of the newest version (v6.0) is unmatched 
as it goes back to 1789 and covers virtually all independent countries, including small nineteenth 
century German principalities, as well as many semi-sovereign polities and overseas colonies. The 
measure is based on seven indicators: executive elections, legislative elections, multi-party 
elections, competitive elections, universal male suffrage, universal female suffrage, and respect for 
political liberties (freedom of expression, assembly, and organization). 2 Five of these capture 
observational features, while the latter two (competitive elections and respect for political liberties) 
                                                     
1 In both cases, the conceptual overlap between the BTI sub-index and the WGI measure is questionable. This 
undermines the rationale of the correlation analysis. 
2 The last indicator, which is used to distinguish between electoral democracies and polyarchies, is new to v6. Other 
additions to this version are indicators on government turnover and different modes of democratic transitions and 
breakdowns. The most recent version of LIED is always available on Dataverse, 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/skaaning, and www.ps.au.dk/dedere.  
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are partly evaluative. All of the indicator scores are published together with the combined measure, 
and the data is updated annually. A systematic inter-rater reliability test was carried out in 
connection to the first version of the dataset (see Skaaning et al. 2015). 
The information contained in the indicators is used to create an ordinal index of electoral 
democracy through a theoretically motivated, cumulative logic (Gerring et al. 2021), where each of 
the seven levels refers to a distinct institutional configurations, i.e., combinations of features related 
to the electoral core of democracy: 
0: legislative_election=0 & executive_elections=0 
1: legislative_elections=1 or executive_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=0  
2: legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=0  
3: legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & 
competitive_elections=0 
4: legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & 
competitive_elections=1 & male_suffrage=0 
5: legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & 
competitive_elections=1 & male_suffrage=1 & female_suffrage=0 
6: legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & 
competitive_elections=1 & male_suffrage=1 & female_suffrage=1 & political_liberties=0 
7: legislative_elections=1 & multi-party_legislative_elections=1 & executive_elections=1 & 
competitive_elections=1 & male_suffrage=1 & female_suffrage=1 & political_liberties=1 
Each of the eight levels reflect a regime type: 1) Non-electoral autocracies, 2) one-party 
autocracies3, 3) multi-party autocracies without executive elections4, 4) multi-party autocracies with 
executive elections, 5) exclusive democracies, 6) male democracies, 7) electoral democracies, and 
8) polyarchies. These type can be used in combination or individually, depending on what is more 
suitable regarding a particular research question. 
                                                     
3 In a few cases, where executive elections are on track but there is no functioning elected parliament, the label 
”one-party autocracies” can be misleading. 
4 Mostly the case when either a monarch influences government appointment and removal or foreign powers 
dominate political decision-making or have significant veto powers. 
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If one instead is interested in thicker understandings of democracy and/or looking for fine-
grained, detailed indices or indicators of democracy, V-Dem is the better alternative (Coppedge et 
al. 2020, 2021a, 2021b, 2021c). The coverage is quite similar to that of LIED with the exception 
of a number of contemporary micro-states and some overseas colonies in the nineteenth century. 
The V-Dem dataset includes hundreds of indicators and a bunch of indices. At the highest level 
of the aggregation, V-Dem provides composite measures of polyarchy, egalitarian democracy, 
liberal democracy, deliberative democracy, and participatory democracy. However, it also includes 
several indicators related to the functioning of political regimes that do not directly tap into these 
principles of democracy. 
Many of the V-Dem indicators are based on expert assessments (1‒2 experts per country-year-
indicator for the period before 1900, mostly 5 or more for the period after). They are combined 
into point estimates with confidence levels via a sophisticated Bayesian IRT measurement model, 
which takes into account coder agreement and coder characteristics. Other indicators are hand-
coded by researchers and research assistants affiliated with V-Dem. The first group of indicators 
generally relies on judgment, whereas the second group is generally of a factual nature. The names 
of the experts are not published for legal and safety reasons, but coder characteristics and coder-
level scores are publicly available. Detailed justifications of conceptual foundations as well as 
empirical appraisals of measurement validity are offered for many of the indicators and indices. 
Hence, among the datasets offering continuous measures of democracy, V-Dem’s polyarchy 




But does it make a difference how democracy is measured? One common way to assess this 
question is to correlate the alternative measures with each other. This procedure has also – but 
this is more questionable 5  – been used to examine the reliability and validity of democracy 
measures. Simple bivariate correlations of the five measures demonstrate that all measures show 
high levels of covariation (see Table 5).6 
BMR generally demonstrates lower covariation with other measures (.77‒.79). The correlations 
between the continuous indices are all in the range of .90‒.91. We thus find that differences in 
                                                     
5 The use of bivariate correlations to assess reliability and validity is dubious when measures are based on different 
sources and definitions and there is no perfect (gold standard) measure for use as baseline criterion. 
6 In the correlational analysis, we use LIED+ from v6.0. 
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measurement procedures are reflected in the scores, although less so the more fine-grained the 
measures. 
Table 5: Simple bivariate correlations between democracy measures 
 BMR BTI DI LIED V-Dem 
BMR 1.00     
BTI .79 1.00    
DI .79 .90 1.00   
LIED .79 .87 .87 1.00  
V-Dem .77 .91 .90 .90 1.00 
Note: Pairwise correlation coefficients; Spearman’s rho when one of the  
Measures is BMR or LIED, otherwise Pearson’s r. 
 
These general tendencies could hide substantial differences in covariation for different sets of 
countries, depending on, for example, the level of economic development, world region, or 
historical period. This would imply that some analyses with a more narrow focus would be more 
affected by the differences than others. Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients associated 
with subgroups of countries or years, which is underexplored in previous studies of correlational 
patterns. 
We have used the median value of the latent GDP/cap. values calculated by Fariss et al. (2017) to 
distinguish between rich and poor societies,7 a distinction between six politico-geographical world 
regions (Teorell et al. 2018), and a separation between the years before and after the end of World 
War II. 
The results for selected combinations show that the covariation is generally lower for relatively 
poor countries,8 the period before 1946, and countries from the Middle East and Africa. BMR 
stands out in this respect, as its ranking of countries deviates quite a bit from LIED and V-Dem 
for these sets of observations; the correlation coefficients are down to levels between .45 and .69. 
And the correlation between DI and V-Dem is even as low as .22 for countries in Western Europe 
and North America. Here, the differences in conceptualization and measurement procedures really 
kick in. These findings strongly indicate that it is implausible to consider the examined democracy 
measures to be fully interchangeable; in some contexts, they are clearly not. 
 
                                                     
7 More particularly, we have used the mean of the variable (.539) in our sample defined by the coverage of LIED. 
8 But only when at least one of the measures is ordinal. 
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Table 6: Conditional bivariate correlations between democracy measures 
 BMR/LIED BMR/V-Dem LIED/V-Dem DI/V-Dem BTI/V-Dem BTI/DI 
Rich .81 .78 .92 .90 .91 .89 












.46 .45 .83 .88 .76 .82 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 





.85 .83 .94 .22 NA NA 
Asia and 
Pacific 
.75 .69 .89 .83 .89 .89 
Before 1946 .61 .63 .85 
NA NA NA 
After 1945 .85 .81 .88 
Note: Pairwise correlation coefficients; Spearman’s rho when one of the measures is BMR or 
LIED, otherwise Pearson’s r. Correlation coefficients lower than .65 are marked with bold. 
 
Conclusion 
Our point of departure in this chapter was that many new democracy measures based on original 
data collection have not been subjected to rigorous comparative evaluation structured by an 
elaborate assessment framework. Our assessment of BMR, BTI, and DI has shown how these 
measures have different strengths and weaknesses with respect to coverage, definitions, data 
collection, and aggregation methods. DI and BTI share many features in that they have very limited 
temporal coverage, they are based on (too) broad definitions, and they include many expert-coded 
 18 
indicators, which are combined into graded sub-indices and an overall democracy measure. In 
contrast, BMR covers most independent countries back to 1800, it is based on a narrow definition 
of democracy, and it merely offers a single, in-house coded, dichotomous variable and is not 
updated on a regular basis. Our assessment has demonstrated that all three measures suffer from 
a lack of transparency, because disaggregate data do not exist or are not made publicly available, 
and/or because modifications of original expert scores in internal review processes are neither 
motivated nor revealed. 
These problems are placed in relief when comparing the three datasets with two other new 
datasets. LIED and V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index appear to have some advantages: LIED 
provides regularly updated disaggregated indicators and a series of ordered, crisp distinctions 
between political regime types for more polities since 1789 than any other dataset. The V-Dem 
dataset, which also has a rather comprehensive scope, offers more detailed and fine-grained 
indicators and indices on many different aspects of democracy than all the alternatives. 
Correlation analysis showed that while all measures tend to be highly correlated, the ordinal 
measures were generally more out of tune with each other than the continuous measures. 
Moreover, additional analyses showed that the covariation is somewhat sensitive to different types 
of context, meaning that interchangeability between the measures should not be taken as given 
even when the overall relationship is strong. Such discrepancies in the associations across different 
samples seem to have been neglected in most of the previous assessments. 
Additional democracy measures are to be expected in the coming years. Hopefully, those behind 
them will pay careful attention to the strengths and weaknesses of their predecessors and the 
constructive advice provided in many thoughtful works on measurement referred to in this 
chapter. In the meantime, users of extant measures – scholars, journalists, governments, and 
NGOs alike – ought to take quality assessments into account before deciding which democracy 
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